| Day |
Date |
Topic |
AssignedReading |
Notes |
| Mon |
Jan26 |
Introduction |
(none) |
|
| Wed |
Jan28 |
Snow Day | CLASSES CANCELLED | CLASSES CANCELLED |
| Fri |
Jan30 |
TheIdea
of
God |
*Rowe,"The
Idea
of God" UDrive |
- Need for Definition - God as personal. - Note on God's gender. - Guiding Principle. - Omnipotence - Omniscience - Maximal Goodness |
| Mon |
Feb2 |
The
Idea of God |
*Rowe,
"The
Idea of God" UDrive |
- Review of Propositions and States of
Affairs - Discussion of God and logic. - Essentiality/Accidentality - Necessary Existence - Essential Eternality - Other perfections - A working definition of God |
| PART I: The Divine Attributes | ||||
| Wed |
Feb4 |
Omnipotence |
Aquinas, "From Summa Contra Gentiles" |
- Preliminary arguments against God's
omnipotence: [4], [22], [18]. - Absolute Account of Omnipotence (AAO) - An argument against AAO Why
the
conclusion is significant.
- Discussion of presenting and
explaining argumentsRationale for each premise. Validity of the argument. - The Thomistic Account of Omnipotence (TAO) - Metaphysically possible/impossible states of affairs. |
| Fri |
Feb6 |
Omnipotence |
Savage, "The Paradox
of the Stone" *Mavrodes, "Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence" UDrive |
- Two related objections to the claim
that an omnipotent God can't create a four-sided triangle. - TAO in action: Divine Suicide - TAO in action: The Paradox of the Stone Mavrodes'
Response
Savage's Response |
| Mon |
Feb9 |
Omnipotence |
Savage, "The Paradox
of the Stone" *Mavrodes, "Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence" UDrive |
-
Critique of Savage's Response - TAO in action: Divine Sin - Aquinas's Response to Divine Sin - Why TAO has trouble with Divine Sin - Responses to Divine Sin: - TAO*
(Problem of Bob)
- Divine Command Theory |
| Wed |
Feb11 |
Goodness |
*Plato,
excerpt
from Euthyphro UDrive |
-
Divine Command Theory (DCT) - Motivations for DCT - Three Inconclusive Arguments against DCT Atheistic Argument
- Sketch of the Euthyphro dilemmaParticular Commands Argument Moral Knowledge Argument |
| Fri |
Feb13 |
Goodness |
-
The Euthyphro Dilemma - Three problems with Option 1: God's commands are arbitrary.
- Problem with Option 2All of morality is contingent. God's goodness is cheap. - Why Option 2 doesn't limit God's power - Note about problem of Divine Sin |
|
| Mon |
Feb16 |
Presidents'
Day |
NO
CLASS |
NO
CLASS |
| Wed |
Feb18 |
Freedom
&
Foreknowledge |
Plantinga,
"On
Ockham's Way Out" (section 1) |
-
The
Dilemma of Freedom & Foreknowledge - Two commitments: Divine Omniscience
- DFF1Human Moral Responsibility - Digression on Compatibilism - Problem with DFF1: necessity of the consequent vs. necessity of the consequence. - DFF2 - Problem with DFF2: invalid. - Showing invalidity with countermodels. |
| Fri |
Feb20 |
Freedom
&
Foreknowledge |
Plantinga,
"On
Ockham's Way Out" (sections 2, 3, & 4) |
-
Five
Principles KET
- The DFF FormulatedDFA FP TP FRP |
| Mon |
Feb23 |
Freedom
&
Foreknowledge |
Re-read: Plantinga, "On Ockham's
Way Out" |
-
Replies
to DFF - Omniscience & Freedom Incompatible No Freedom
- Omniscience & Freedom CompatibleAtheism (Deny God's Omniscience) Aristotelianism
Boethianism |
| Wed |
Feb25 |
Freedom
&
Foreknowledge |
*Plantinga,
Necomb
excerpt from "On Ockham's Way Out" UDrive *Nozick, "Newcomb's Problem…" (excerpt) UDrive |
-
Ockhamism - Hard Fact/Soft Fact Distinction - How Ockhamism shows DFF to be unsound. - A slightly different DFF: Fixity of the Hard Past. - Why God's past knowing is a Soft Fact. - The Dilemma of Freedom and Forebelief |
| Fri |
Feb27 |
Freedom
&
Foreknowledge |
*Plantinga,
Necomb
excerpt from "On Ockham's Way Out" UDrive *Nozick, "Newcomb's Problem…" (excerpt) UDrive |
TAKE-HOME ESSAY
ASSIGNED (on UDrive, File name: Essay1) - Two responses to the Dilemma of Freedom and Forebelief Plantinga's Response
- Newcomb's Problem and Ockhamism.Van Inwagen's Response |
| PART II: Our
Knowledge of God |
||||
| Mon |
Mar2 |
Snow
Day |
CLASSES
CANCELLED |
CLASSES
CANCELLED |
| Wed |
Mar4 |
Pascal's
Wager |
Pascal,
B.
“From Pensees” *Hajek, A. "Pascal's Wager" Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |
-
Faith:
What is it? Faith 1 and its problems
- Epistemic ought vs. prudential oughtFaith 2 - Pascal: there is no conclusive epistemic reason to either believe or not believe in God. - Pascal as giving a prudential reason to believe in God. - Decision making under uncertainty - The Principle of Dominance |
| Fri |
Mar4 |
Pascal's
Wager |
Pascal,
B.
“From Pensees” *Hajek, A. “Pascal's Wager” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |
TAKE-HOME ESSAY DUE - The Argument From Dominance - Objection: assuming God exists, the life of a nonbeliever may have more value. - The Argument From Expected Value - The Principle of Expected Value - Objection: if p(God) is low, then the argument fails. - The Argument From Dominating Expected Value |
| Mon |
Mar9 |
Pascal's
Wager |
Pascal,
B.
“From Pensees” *Hajek, A. “Pascal's Wager” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |
-
The
Argument From Dominating Expected Value - Why p(God) is not zero (betting story) - The Voluntarist Objection: "I can't choose my beliefs" - The Many-gods Objection - Why Decision Theory breaks down when there are infinite values |
| Wed |
Mar11 |
James/Clifford |
Clifford,
W.
“The Ethics of Belief” *James, W. “The Will to Believe” [Optional] link |
-
Clifford's
Evidentialism - Two ideas about belief All-or-Nothing
- Why Evidentialism rules out Theistic belief or Atheistic belief if
the evidence is equivocal.Graded - The Ship Owner Example Two Ship Owner Arguments and why
they fail.
- The General Argument for EvidentialismMidterm Exam Review Tonight: 7-9 PM, 201 Bartlett Hall |
| Fri |
Mar13 |
James/Clifford |
Van
Inwagen,
P. “It is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for
Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence.” *James, W. “The Will to Believe” [Optional] link |
-
Clifford's
General Argument for Evidentialism - Argument 3 (see handout) and response - Argument 4 (see handout) and response - Different kinds of obligation: Moral Consequential
- E-EvidentialismMoral Non-consequential Epistemic Consequential Epistemic Non-consequential |
| Spring
Break |
||||
| Mon |
Mar23 |
Optional Class Meeting: Review Session.
(Come with questions). |
MIDTERM
EXAM TIME:
7-9PM
LOCATION: 206
BARTLETT HALL
|
MIDTERM
EXAM Notes on Midterm/Answers |
| Wed |
Mar25 |
James/Clifford | Van
Inwagen,
P. “It is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for
Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence.” *James, W. “The Will to Believe” [Optional] link |
-
James's
Response to Clifford - Van Inwagen's Response to Clifford - The Problem of Disagreement |
| Fri |
Mar27 |
Is
Belief
in God Basic? |
Plantinga,
A.
“Warranted Belief in God.” (pp. 285-top of
290; pp. 293-296) *Plantinga, A. “Belief Without Argument.” (p. 225) UDrive |
-
Basic
Beliefs/Non-Basic Beliefs - Sufficient Warrant/Immediate Warrant/Transfer Warrant - Foundationalism - Strong vs. Weak Foundationalism
- Plantinga's proposal: belief in God as basic and immediately
warranted.- What kinds of things are basic for Strong Foundationalism? - Argument against Strong Foundationalism - What kinds of things are basic for Weak Foundationalism? - Comparison of perceptual beliefs/perceptual mechanism with the sensus divinitatus. |
| Mon |
Mar30 |
Is
Belief
in God Basic? |
*Martin, M. “Belief
Without Argument: A Critique.” (pp. 272-276) UDrive *Hasker, W. “The Case of the Intellectually Sophisticated Theist.” (pp. 282-284) UDrive |
-
Objections
to Plantinga -The GP Objection
-The Atheistic-Sense Objection -The Problem of Defeaters |
| Wed |
Apr1 |
Hume
&
Miracles |
Hume,
D.
“Of Miracles” *Dawid & Gillies, “A Bayesian Analysis of Hume's Argument Concerning Miracles” [Optional] link |
-
Hume's
Argument - Note about miracles - Note about what Hume's argument isn't. Hume isn't claiming that miracles are impossible. - Presentation of the Lotto Objection |
| Fri |
Apr3 |
Work on Group Presentations |
Read
the
article you've been assigned for Group Presentations link |
|
| Mon |
Apr6 |
Hume
&
Miracles |
More,
T.
“From A Dialogue Concerning Heresies” Cover, J. A. “Miracles and Christian Theism” (pp. 341-344) [Optional] |
-
Presentation of the Science Objection - Bayesian Confirmation Theory - Probabilities refer to rational
degrees of belief
- Bayesian Version of Hume's Argument- Explanation of probability - Explanation of conditional probability - Explanation of Bayes' Theorem - Example using Bayes' Theorem to calculate the probability of drawing a heart, given that the card is red. |
| Wed |
Apr8 |
Hume
&
Miracles |
More,
T. “From A Dialogue Concerning Heresies” Cover, J. A. “Miracles and Christian Theism” (pp. 341-344) [Optional] |
-
Bayesian Version of the Lotto Objection - Big question: why is P(M) < P(R/~M) in the case of miracles and yet P(N) > P(P/~N) in the lotto case? - Five answers to the big question (see handout) and whether or not they are good answers. - Response to the Science Objection (see handout) |
| PART III: Arguments For & Against God's Existence | ||||
| Fri |
Apr10 |
Fine-Tuning |
*Paley,
W.
“The Watch and the Watchmaker” UDrive Dawkins, R. “God’s Utility Function” |
-
Brief Sketch of the three main arguments for the existence of God. - Analogical vs. Inference to the Best Explanation Design Arguments - Explanation of how Inference to the Best Explanation works - The Surprise Principle - Paley's Watch Argument - Paley's Eye Argument - Darwinian Response |
| Mon |
Apr13 |
Fine-Tuning |
Dawkins,
R.
“God’s Utility Function” Schlesinger, G. “From New Perspectives on Old-time Religion” |
-
Dawkins' Design Argument against
theism. - The Fine-Tuning Argument - The Surprise Principle Version
- The Probabilistic Version |
| Wed |
Apr15 |
Fine-Tuning |
Schlesinger,
G.
“From New Perspectives on Old-time
Religion” *Monton, B. “God, Fine-Tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence” [Optional] link |
-Objections
to
the Fine-Tuning Argument - A. Fine-tuning evidence at best
supports the claim that there is some
designer, not that a particular kind of designer exists.
- B. The Chance Objection: unlikely events happen all the time, without implying "design hypotheses". - C. The Anthropic Objection: the fine-tuned laws of nature are not surprising at all, for it is impossible that we observe non-fine-tuned laws of nature. |
| Fri |
Apr17 |
Fine-Tuning |
*Monton, B. “God, Fine-Tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence” [Optional] link | -Objections
to
the Fine-Tuning Argument (cont.) - D. The Many Universes Objection
- The shooter in the woods example. - If M (there are many universes) is true, then G does not render F more likely: P(F/~G & M) = P(F/G & M) - But, F does not give us reason to believe M (Inverse Gambler's Fallacy). |
| Tue |
Apr21 |
Problem
of
Evil |
Al-Ghazali,
“From
Theodicy in Islamic Thought” *Voltaire, Excerpt from Candide (Ch. V) link |
-
Explanation of Possible Worlds - Why Al-Ghazali and Leibniz think that God would create (and has created) the best possible world. - Voltaire's claim that this world is not the best possible world. - The Candide Argument - Responses to the Candide Argument - A. Divine Command Theory
- B. Goodness Requires Evil i. Goodness requires evil
ii. Knowledge of goodness requires evil - C. No Best World
i. Incommensurable Values
|
| Wed |
Apr22 |
Problem
of
Evil |
Rowe, W. L. “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.” |
- C. No Best World (cont.)
ii. Infinite Hierarchy of Worlds
- "Evil" = Intrinsic Badness- Intrinsic vs. Instrumental
Goods/Bads
- The Logical Problem of Evil- Support for Premise 1: God's
Omnipotence, Omniscience, Perfectly Good (principle about good persons)
- Support for Premise 2
- Response to The Logical Problem of Evil: deny Premise 1 (modified
principle about good persons).- The Evidential Problem of Evil |
| Fri |
Apr24 |
Problem of Evil | Gaon,
S.
“From The Book of Doctrines and Belief” *Lewis, excerpt from “Evil For Freedom’s Sake?” (pp. 101-109, 119-127) UDrive |
-
The Evidential Problem of Evil further explained. - Ways to explain why some evil is permissible ((a), (b), and (c)). - Whatever explanation we give must show why some evil is metaphysically necessary for some greater good (disanalogy with the dentist case). - Theodicies - Evil necessary for recognition of good. - The Infinite Intellect - The Free Will Theodicy - The Selective Freedom Response to the Free Will Theodicy |
| Mon |
Apr27 |
Problem of Evil | *Lewis,
excerpt
from “Evil For Freedom’s Sake?” (pp.
101-109, 119-127) UDrive Van Inwagen, “The Magnitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil” |
TAKE-HOME ESSAY
ASSIGNED (on UDrive, File name: Essay2) - The Selective Freedom Response Explained. - Responses to the Selective Freedom Response - Rejoinders to the Responses - Van Inwagen's Free Will Theodicy Explained |
| Wed |
Apr29 |
Problem of Evil | Van Inwagen, “The Magnitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil” | -
Five Objections to Van Inwagen's Free Will Theodicy. - Response to Objection 1 - why God didn't restore fallen creatures immediately. - Response to Objection 3 - why there might not be a minimum amount of necessary evil. |
| PART IV: Student Presentations |
||||
| Fri |
May1 |
Presentations |
Group
1:
"Physicalism and Omniscience" Group 2: "Response to Beyer" Group 3: An Iranaean Theodicy" |
|
| Mon |
May4 |
Presentations |
Group
4:
"Natural Evil and the Possibility of Knowledge" Group 5: "Coercion and the Hiddenness of God" Group 6: "The Hiddenness of God" |
TAKE-HOME ESSAY DUE |
| Wed | May6 |
Presentations |
Group
7:
"Morality: Religious and
Secular" Group 8: "Two Separate Domains" Group 9: "Science Discredits Religion" |
|
| Fri |
May8 |
Presentations |
Group
10:
"Faith" and "Faith & Reason" Group 11: "The Presumption of Atheism" Group 12: "God as the Ultimate Conspiracy Theory" |
|
| Mon |
May11 |
Wrap-Up |
No
reading |
|