

The obscure act of perception

Jeffrey Dunn

Received: 23 March 2007 / Accepted: 23 May 2007 / Published online: 10 July 2007
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Abstract Finding disjunctivist versions of direct realism unexplanatory, Mark Johnston [(2004). *Philosophical Studies*, 120, 113–183] offers a non-disjunctive version of direct realism in its place and gives a defense of this view from the problem of hallucination. I will attempt to clarify the view that he presents and then argue that, once clarified, it either does not escape the problem of hallucination or does not look much like direct realism.

Keywords Direct realism · Hallucination · Perception

1 Direct realism

Interesting metaphysical and epistemological issues depend on how one conceives of our perceptual contact with the external world. Recently, direct realism has gained popularity as a way of conceiving of this perceptual contact. Mark Johnston has proposed an intricate version of such a position in his article “The Obscure Object of Hallucination”. Finding disjunctivist versions of direct realism unexplanatory, Johnston formulates a non-disjunctivist version of direct realism and attempts a defense of this view from the problem of hallucination. This paper will be an analysis of Johnston’s view, with the eventual conclusion that his non-disjunctivist version of direct realism is either unintelligible or not a version of direct realism. Before embarking on such an analysis, however, it is important to be a bit clearer about the metaphysical and epistemological picture that direct realism presents.

Direct realism is a theory about how we are made aware of things in the external world. I see it as committed to two fundamental theses. First, direct realists must be

J. Dunn (✉)

Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, 377 Bartlett Hall, 130 Hicks Way,
Amherst, MA 01003-9269, USA
e-mail: jdunn@philos.umass.edu

committed to realism about a mind-independent external world. Direct realists assent to the claim that there is an external world and that this external world is composed of what we might call real-world or physical objects. One can be a realist, in this sense, and yet have different views about just what these real-world objects are. For instance, one might think that real-world objects are property bundles, spacetime worms, three-dimensional time slices, or regions of spacetime. Direct realists need not be agreed on that issue.¹

The second thesis of direct realism is more difficult to nail down. To be a direct realist, one must not only be a realist in the way outlined above, one must also be committed to the idea that we have some form of direct contact with these particulars via perception. Since direct realism is a thesis about perception, this direct contact will be some species of *awareness*. That is, the direct realist is committed to the claim that an agent can be directly *aware* of particulars in the physical world.

Given only this brief sketch of the direct realist position, we are able to formulate the alleged advantages it has and perhaps see the motivation for Johnston's defense. Direct realism can be seen as a metaphysical thesis, an epistemological thesis, or as both. The traditional advantages of the direct realist position were thought to have come from it as an epistemological thesis. If we are directly aware of particulars, then it would seem there is less for us to be mistaken about in our knowledge of the external world. This seems to provide a nice response to the skeptic. We need not doubt that there is an external world separate from our own minds, for we are directly aware of it. In *Perception and the Physical World*, for instance, D. M. Armstrong argues for the converse: that an indirect theory of perception leads to lurking doubt over the existence of the external world.² The implication is that direct realism reduces such doubt. Direct realism also seems to offer a succinct answer to questions that Kant famously puzzled over as to what the world is really like in itself. If we are directly aware of physical particulars, then it would seem we have direct awareness of the world as it is in itself. The direct realist picture has also been thought to provide a nice foundation for a foundationalist picture of justification. If our beliefs require justification from an incorrigible foundation, then direct awareness of the external world (or beliefs coming from such awareness) might be a good candidate for such a foundation.

Thought of as a metaphysical thesis, direct realism purports to have further advantages, specifically along considerations of ontological parsimony. Consider a sense-data theorist, someone like Bertrand Russell, or H. H. Price.³ Such theorists hold that there are external objects, and that there are internal sense-data. It is via direct awareness of the internal sense-data that we are indirectly aware of external objects. The direct realist does away with the middle man. Rejecting the existence of mysterious sense-data, which seem to do little theoretical work outside questions

¹ I will follow Johnston's terminology in which 'particular' seems to pick out what we might call 'real world objects', things like chairs, apples, and people. 'Objects' on the other hand is the more general term which can pick out particulars as well as abstract objects like universals and propositions.

² Armstrong (1961), p. 30.

³ See for instance, Russell (1997) or Price (1961).

of hallucination and misperception, the direct realist holds that we are directly aware of the external objects. If the direct realist can explain the phenomena without recourse to sense-data, theirs would seem to be a simpler and more elegant theory.

In canvassing these alleged advantages of direct realism the details have been left admittedly quite vague. It turns out that the details often have to be left at this level of generality for the advantages of direct realism to seem attainable. Recently, for instance, Laurence Bonjour has argued that the alleged epistemological advantages of direct realism are more illusory than real.⁴ This becomes more obvious the sharper one's theory of direct realism becomes. Nevertheless, it is good to keep in mind what the traditional advantages of direct realism are meant to be. This will be of aid as we evaluate Johnston's version of the theory. If a version of direct realism cannot attain *any* of its alleged advantages, then that should be a strike against that version of the theory.

2 Directness examined

In the brief sketch of direct realism, it was noted that the direct realist is committed to the claim that awareness of particulars is direct. We might distinguish between two ways of saying that awareness of particulars is direct:

- (a) Awareness of particulars is not mediated by anything.
- (b) Awareness of particulars is not mediated by another act of awareness.

The best and not obviously absurd forms of direct realism assert (b) and not (a). Light rays, the retina, the optic nerve, and the brain—to name but a few—all seem to mediate our awareness of particulars in the world. David Kelley, for instance, writes: “In calling a mode of awareness direct, we cannot mean that it is unmediated by *any* causal process.”⁵ Pierre LeMorvan also urges that (b) gets more at the defining features of direct realism:

Direct Realists hold that perception is an immediate or direct awareness of mind-independent physical objects or events in the external world; in taking this awareness to be immediate or direct, Direct Realists deny that the perception of these physical objects or events requires a prior awareness of some *tertium quid* mediating between the mind and external physical objects or events.⁶

The key claim of the direct realist, according to LeMorvan, is that there is no prior act of awareness necessary for awareness of physical objects. This seems to be the sensible thing to say. Michael Huemer also goes along with this interpretation of

⁴ Bonjour (2004), pp. 366–367. But he is certainly not alone. Harold Brown (1992) argues that direct realism gives us no better way to know the intrinsic properties of physical objects. Frank Jackson, in his (1977), writes: “The representationalist and the direct realist differ profoundly over the looks-is distinction, but are in the same situation regarding the epistemology of the distinction.” (p. 149). Andrew Ward (1976) also takes a similar line.

⁵ Kelley (1986), p. 58.

⁶ LeMorvan (2004), p. 221.

direct realism. In his book, *Skepticism and the Veil of Perception*, he writes: “You are directly aware of x if you are aware of x , and your awareness of x is not based on your awareness of anything else.”⁷ Harold Brown is in agreement on this point as well: “A philosophically more important case occurs when one holds that we perceive public objects only as a result of perceiving some private entity. Direct realists deny that perception is indirect in this sense.”⁸

We can be more specific still, however, in spelling out how this awareness of particulars is supposed to work. The commonsense way of understanding what it is to be aware of some object x is in terms of awareness of the properties that x has. What it is to be aware of a plant is to be aware of the plant’s properties of greenness, and plant-shaped-ness. Fred Dretske holds a view something like this. He says that we are aware of the qualities of physical objects and that this is not mediated by any other sort of awareness. He writes: “When the perception is veridical, the qualities one becomes p -aware of in having a perceptual experience are qualities of external objects (the pumpkins) that one experiences, not qualities of the pumpkin experience.”⁹ On such an explication of direct awareness, we do not get rid of the term ‘awareness’, but merely specify more clearly what it is we are aware of. Direct awareness of x is being aware of x ’s properties without being aware of them by being aware of some other properties. It might be that the properties of one’s brain state or one’s experience are the things that make one aware of x ’s properties, but, importantly, one is not *aware of* the properties of one’s brain state or experience. (For convenience, we can term this sort of awareness *property awareness*).

Although understanding perceptual awareness in terms of property awareness is perhaps the most commonsense way of formulating things, there is another way that one might go. One could understand awareness *of* in terms of awareness *that*. Above, to be directly aware of the plant was to be aware of the plant’s properties. On this other view, to be aware of a plant is to be aware *that* (or have the belief *that*) there is a plant over there. D. M. Armstrong holds a version of direct realism by which all perception is the acquiring of beliefs.¹⁰ Thus, there are instances of what he calls immediate perception (or, as we’ve been calling it, ‘direct awareness’) when we acquire, via the eyes, the belief that there is a plant over there. For Armstrong perceptual awareness *of* is to be understood in terms of believing *that*. It would seem that his view is less concerned with the awareness of properties, and more concerned with the acquisition of beliefs about the properties or particulars. George Pitcher also presents something close to this idea. He says that perception is

⁷ Huemer (2001), p. 55.

⁸ Brown (1992), p. 343.

⁹ Dretske (2000), p. 168. ‘ p -aware’ is a technical term Dretske introduces to make it clear that we are speaking of *property*-awareness, which he distinguishes from *fact*-awareness and *object*-awareness. Given that Dretske countenances these other sorts of awareness, his view is somewhat more complex than it initially appears. For Dretske, direct veridical awareness of particulars involves some combination of *property*-awareness and *object*-awareness. It is, nevertheless, *property*-awareness that accounts for our perceptual experience of the world. Later, as we evaluate Johnston’s theory, more will be said about this sort of move. Brown (1992), too, seems to understand direct awareness in terms of property awareness.

¹⁰ See, for instance Armstrong (1976), pp. 209–211, or (1961), p. 106.

the acquiring of true beliefs about physical objects: "... to be aware of, or to have, that visual presentation or manifold just is to know, by means of using one's eyes, that there is a piece of paper lying before one, that it is white and rectangular, and so on."¹¹ According to Pitcher, then, for me to be aware of the piece of paper is for me to acquire (in the right way) the true belief that there is a piece of paper in front of me.

On this explication of awareness, direct awareness of x is believing that x is f without believing that x is f via some other belief. It is on this sort of view of perception that the role of inference is important to theories of direct realism. When I see a green plant, for instance, does the belief that my eyes are reliable play a role in producing the belief that the plant is green? If so, then the acquisition of such a belief will not count as direct awareness of the plant. Kelley seems to be concerned with perception being inferentially direct and thus might be thought to have a view of direct awareness that is similar to Armstrong and Pitcher: "We can understand direct awareness only by contrast with knowledge that results from consciously directed processes of integrating information. And by that criterion, perception clearly seems direct."¹² (We can term this sort of awareness *doxastic awareness*).

We should be clear about the similarities and differences between these different views of awareness. Both views will be able to claim that we are directly aware of particulars. Both can say that what they mean by this is that we are directly aware of the properties of particulars. But someone who maintained a form of doxastic awareness will go further and explain direct awareness of properties in terms of the acquisition of beliefs to the effect *that* a certain property is present. Someone who maintains a form of property awareness will deny that this need be the case. We can be aware *of* a property without the corresponding belief *that* the property is present. Sometimes, such a theorist can hold, awareness *of* a property does lead to a belief *that* such a property is present, but that does not mean that awareness *of* a property just is believing *that* a property is present.

It might seem odd that in all this discussion of awareness, phenomenology has not been explicitly mentioned. One might think it very plausible that phenomenology does considerable work for both views of direct awareness. Nothing about phenomenology, however, is *required* by the views of direct awareness considered. Nevertheless, philosophers who consider these issues do, almost universally, tie in phenomenological experience with their theories of awareness.

When awareness is construed as property awareness, it seems especially clear why phenomenology is invoked in the account. A commonsense thing to say is that awareness of the properties of x is facilitated by a phenomenological experience of those properties. It is via this phenomenological experience (though not by being aware of the experience) that we are made aware of the properties of objects. Along these lines, Dretske writes:

¹¹ Pitcher (1971), p. 66.

¹² Kelley (1986), p. 68. He also asserts that direct awareness is to be understood as something that does not involve association, inference, hypothesis, computation, or calculation. This makes awareness seem to be concerned with propositional entities, things like beliefs and knowledge states (p. 41).

...the object of the experience in question (what it is we see, hear, smell and taste) is that object (or set of objects) whose properties the experience represents in a primary way. An experience *need not* (and obviously does not) carry information about *all* the properties of the perceptual object... The *perceptual object* is the thing that has *these* qualities.¹³

Without the phenomenological experience, awareness of properties would seem to fall into mystery as we are left with nothing to say about how such awareness might function. Johnston also seems to connect phenomenology up with awareness in this way.¹⁴

If we construe awareness of *x* as doxastic awareness, then the connection between phenomenology and awareness might not seem as tight. I can acquire a belief about *x* without phenomenological experience of *x*. When you tell me that it is snowing outside, I acquire a belief about the weather without a phenomenological experience of the weather. There is no principled reason to think this could not also happen in direct perceptual encounters. Nevertheless, philosophers that hold this view of direct awareness still seem to tie phenomenology into the notion of awareness. Kelley, for instance, though he seems to identify direct awareness with knowledge acquisition holds that it is "...the objects themselves we are aware of by means of their appearances."¹⁵ It is by way of phenomenological experience that awareness of particulars in the world is facilitated. This is how the belief acquisition gets its directness. On this view, the phenomenological experiences facilitate the beliefs about particulars in the world, although importantly, the beliefs are not *about* the phenomenological experience.

At this point, we have identified one fundamental feature of direct realist theories, and two broad ways in which this might be sharpened. The fundamental feature is that awareness of particulars is not mediated by some other act of awareness. We can sharpen this by either characterizing awareness in terms of property awareness, in which case the awareness is awareness *of* the properties of particulars. On the other hand, we can characterize the awareness in terms of belief (or knowledge) acquisition, in which case awareness is awareness *that* certain particulars are present or *that* they have certain properties. This direct awareness, in turn, is thought to be intimately related to phenomenological experience.

We are now in a position to present the argument from hallucination that is thought to give trouble for a direct realist theory of perception. We can then present Johnston's theory and see how his version of the theory fits within the framework of direct realist theories presented above. As we go, attention will be primarily directed at Johnston's theory of direct realism as a metaphysical thesis. However, towards the end of the paper we will explore some epistemological consequences of the kind of picture Johnston seems to present, and see if such consequences can motivate the metaphysical picture Johnston appears to give us.

¹³ Dretske (1982), p. 162. Dretske (2000) again mentions the connection between phenomenology and awareness: "The phenomenology of perceptual experience is determined by the totality of qualities one is *p*-aware of..."(p. 164).

¹⁴ For instance, Johnston (2004), p. 117.

¹⁵ Kelley (1986), p. 41.

3 The problem

If one is a direct realist (in one of the ways indicated above), then the phenomenon of hallucination can give rise to a difficult problem. It is fairly clear how the problem goes. According to the direct realist, we are directly aware of objects in the world. But imagine the following case: I am in a dark room and veridically seeing an illuminated clock on the far wall. Compare this to the case where I am in a dark room and merely hallucinating an illuminated clock on the far wall. Such cases can be phenomenologically indistinguishable for me, the agent experiencing them. In both cases it seems as though I am aware of the same thing. And yet in the case of hallucination, I can't be aware of an object in the world, aware of its properties, or aware that it has certain properties—by hypothesis, there is no such object. And yet things are phenomenologically the same in veridical seeing and hallucination. Surely this is because I am aware of the same object in both cases. But then whatever I'm directly aware of in veridical seeing is *not* the object in the world (the clock), but rather some other object. What I'm aware of in hallucination isn't a particular in the world and we infer that I'm aware of the same thing in veridical perception. Contrary to direct realism, then, I am not directly aware of particulars in the world, I am directly aware of mental objects and only *indirectly* aware of particulars. This is how we explain the fact that hallucinations can be so vivid: we are directly aware of the same thing in both hallucination and veridical perception.¹⁶

It is Johnston's project to confront this problem for the direct realist. The subtlety of the theory he lays out is tremendous, yet the basic response is clear and quite a natural one. The account of hallucination given proceeds derivatively from an account of veridical perception. He says that when we see a scene before our eyes, we are properly thought of as being aware of a complex structured universal, what he calls a *sensible profile*. Further, this sensible profile is instantiated in normal cases of seeing. So, in cases of normal perception in response to the question, 'What are we aware of?', the direct realist should say, 'An instantiated sensible profile'. When we ask what it is we are aware of in a case of hallucination, we can't be aware of an instantiated universal, because nothing is instantiated. That is what a hallucination is. So, Johnston makes an obvious move. We need to simply take away the object while leaving everything else the same. What we must be aware of, then, is an uninstantiated sensible profile. That is the object we are directly acquainted with and, it is alleged, there is no problem for the direct realist.

This is certainly one way to describe what is happening in the case of hallucination. What we must ask is if such a way of understanding the nature of hallucination leaves us with more or less difficulties for the direct realist. We can further ask if such a conception retains a truly direct realist view of perception.

¹⁶ It should be pointed out that the argument from hallucination can be used for a metaphysical or an epistemological thesis. As an argument for a metaphysical thesis, we stress that the phenomenological sameness needs accounting for, and introduce some identical mental object of which we are aware in both cases. As an argument for an epistemological thesis, we argue that hallucination can be just as vivid phenomenologically as veridical seeing. From phenomenological experience, then, we cannot know we are aware of particulars in the world, thus leading to scepticism about the external world. Focus will be primarily on the argument as advocating a metaphysical thesis.

Finally, we can see if the kind of theory Johnston leaves us with is able to capture any of the alleged epistemological advantages of the direct realist position.

4 Johnston's principles and commitments

As Johnston formulates his theory he is careful to construct it so as to distance himself from two different views about perception and its relation to hallucination. One of these views he calls 'conjunctivism', and the other he calls 'disjunctivism'. Disjunctivist direct realists hold that episodes of hallucination and episodes of veridical perception are wholly distinct kinds of states. Thus, they have an easy response to the problem of hallucination: we are directly aware of particulars in veridical perception and we are directly aware of something different in hallucination. Johnston, however, finds disjunctivism an unexplanatory theory: "In fact, the Disjunctive View is deeply unexplanatory when it comes to accounting for (i) certain phenomenologically seamless transitions from hallucination to seeing, and (ii) the distinctive nature of hallucination itself."¹⁷

Johnston is also concerned to distance himself from conjunctivism. The conjunctivist, according to Johnston, maintains that there is some common object of awareness in hallucination and in veridical seeing¹⁸. In veridical seeing, according to the conjunctivist, we are aware of the same kind of object we are aware of in hallucination, and we are aware of something extra, the particular in the world. (Some appropriate, usually causal, relation is often posited between these two.) Hallucination is then explained by merely dropping the second conjunct. An acceptance of conjunctivism usually entails a denial of direct realism, for the conjunctivist will often hold that the awareness of the particular in the world is mediated by the awareness of the object that is similar between hallucination and veridical seeing.

There are several other important assumptions and principles of which Johnston makes use and that are critical for understanding and critiquing his thesis. Johnston is committed to what I call the *Hallucination Hypothesis*. This says that it is a genuine possibility that acts of hallucination and veridical seeing be phenomenologically indistinguishable for the subject. He writes:

The argument from hallucination begins from the disputed, but not ultimately deniable, fact that there could be cases in which delusive and veridical sensings really are indistinguishable from the point of view of the one enjoying them.¹⁹

¹⁷ Johnston (2004), pp. 121–122. William Fish (2004) formulates direct realism as necessarily disjunctivist. Andrew Ward (1976) also seems to assume that the direct realist is committed to some form of disjunctivism (p. 288). It might be true that many direct realists are disjunctivists. It might even be true that any consistent form of direct realism will be disjunctivist. Nevertheless, Johnston is trying to carve out a non-disjunctivist form of direct realism. If we take Fish's suggestion, then such a project is a logical impossibility. We should not do away with Johnston's view so quickly.

¹⁸ I follow the convention of appealing only to examples of sight when discussing perception. Of course, neither veridical perception nor hallucination are limited to sight. However, nothing that I know of turns on this bit of myopia, and it is much simpler to focus on one sense modality.

¹⁹ Johnston (2004), p. 113.

This also underscores the earlier point, that Johnston is concerned most obviously with defending a kind of direct realism tied to phenomenology.

In addition to accepting the Hallucination Hypothesis, Johnston is committed to what I call the *Differentiating Principle* (DP). This principle relates acts of awareness to objects of awareness. It says that different *acts* of awareness are to be individuated by different *objects* of awareness. DP permits of a trivial reading, where each token act of awareness can be individuated by the token object of that awareness. So, my act of awareness of the book on my shelf is a different token than my act of awareness of a different book on the library shelf. Johnston means something stronger. He writes: "...types of acts of awareness are plausibly individuated by the types of objects that they present to the subject..."²⁰ Thus, DP says that if the object of awareness is of a different *kind*, then the act of awareness is of a different *kind*. This clarification of DP will be important as we analyze Johnston's theory.

It is also important to note that Johnston very explicitly rejects a principle that he calls the *Phenomenal Bottleneck Principle* (PBP). PBP says, according to Johnston, "If two acts of awareness are qualitatively indistinguishable for their subject then objects of the very same type are directly presented in each act of awareness."²¹ It is important to see how Johnston argues against PBP and how his argument constrains what he should have license to do with its denial. To show PBP false, Johnston asks us to imagine lying in bed at dawn as the room slowly and gradually goes from darkness to daylight. He says that if we pick times t_n and t_{n+1} such that the two times are close enough together, the lightness in the room at t_n is phenomenologically indistinguishable from the lightness at t_{n+1} . Yet on the assumption that the room is gradually growing lighter, that it starts in darkness and ends in daylight, we must conclude that the lightness in the room was different at t_n than it was at t_{n+1} . Thus, phenomenological indistinguishability does not indicate that the objects of awareness are the same.

I agree with Johnston's conclusion, but would like to warn against misusing the denial of PBP. Although Johnston's argument has shown that phenomenological indistinguishability does not indicate the same objects of awareness, it still seems to point to some vast *similarities* between the objects. In particular, Johnston's reason for rejecting PBP does not seem to point to a difference in *kind* between the objects of awareness. Indeed, though Johnston rejects PBP, David Hilbert points out that Johnston accepts a similar, yet weaker form of the principle.²² It is true that *everything* about the objects of awareness need not be the same in cases of phenomenological indistinguishability, this much seems undeniable. But Johnston still needs to maintain that in cases of phenomenological indistinguishability there is similarity between the two objects to explain this sameness of phenomenology. He writes:

²⁰ Johnston (2004), pp. 116–117. See also, p. 139.

²¹ Johnston (2004), p. 151.

²² Hilbert (2004), p. 186.

My thesis will be that items suited to be the primary objects of hallucination are factors in common between hallucinations and corresponding veridical sensings, common factors that explain the possibility of seamless transitions from cases of hallucination to cases of veridical perception.²³

We might call this weaker version of PBP, the *Phenomenal Unification Principle* (PUP). Given his argument against PBP we can formulate what it would look like:

PUP: Awareness of an object O1 and awareness of a different object O2 can give phenomenologically indistinguishable experiences only if O1 is similar to O2.

There is one final distinction that Johnston draws, which deserves close attention. He is committed to what he calls (and what others have called) the *Act/Object Distinction*. This, quite simply, is the claim that in cases of awareness (whether hallucinatory or veridical) there is some object in some category or other of which the subject is aware. Awareness is therefore always a two-place relation between a subject and an object (of some sort), and this holds in hallucination and in veridical perception.²⁴ It is important to point this out, because it is at this point that Johnston makes a break from some other direct realists. For instance, Michael Huemer (2001) gives an extended defense of direct realism and spends several pages responding to the argument from hallucination. The problem is much simpler for Huemer to solve, however, because he rejects the Act/Object Distinction for cases of hallucination. According to Huemer, if *S* is aware of *x*, this implies that *x* exists. He writes:

For hallucination is not awareness at all. It is, so to speak, pseudo-awareness—that is, a mental state that seems like awareness of something (and, in terms of its intrinsic properties, is just like perceptual awareness) but is not in fact the awareness of anything, for awareness is a relation between the subject and the world, and the hallucination fails to have the right relational properties.²⁵

Johnston wants to maintain that we *are* aware of something during episodes of hallucination and so his version of direct realism will be quite different than Huemer's. His defense against the argument from hallucination will be quite different, as well. Huemer can deny that we are aware *of* anything in episodes of hallucination, and so there is no implication that a prior act of awareness mediates our perception of the external world. It is important to notice that Johnston adopts a very different kind of direct realism and so Johnston does not have this option.

5 Johnston's theory

Recall that it is from a non-conjunctivist and non-disjunctivist vantage point that Johnston formulates his theory. His denial of disjunctivism will mean that there

²³ Johnston (2004), p. 138.

²⁴ See Johnston (2004), pp. 127–128.

²⁵ Huemer (2001), p. 127.

cannot be two wholly separate accounts of hallucination and perception. Because of his commitment to something like PUP and the Hallucination Hypothesis, however, he needs to have something common between cases of veridical perception and hallucination. This will bring him very close to a conjunctive analysis. Thus, we can see that Johnston will be walking a fine line. He needs to deny the conjunctivist's conclusion that we are directly aware of the same object in hallucination and in veridical perception, but not go so far as to embrace disjunctivism.

To reach an explicit statement of how this theory is meant to work, we need to make sense of Johnston's technical term, 'sensible profile'. This is to be understood as a kind of complex structured universal. Johnston writes that a sensible profile is "a scene type ... a complex, partly qualitative and partly relational property, which exhausts the way the particular scene before your eyes is if your present experience is veridical."²⁶ He goes on to further underline the point that a sensible profile is a universal saying that it is "a relational type rather than a token, a universal rather than a particular."²⁷

With all this, then, Johnston's account of veridical seeing and hallucination falls out quite easily. Hallucination, he says, is awareness of an uninstantiated sensible profile. Veridical seeing is awareness of an instantiated sensible profile. He tells us: "In sensory hallucination one is aware of complexes of sensible qualities and relations. In veridical sensing one is aware of instantiations of complexes of sensible qualities, relations, and sensible natural kinds."²⁸ The sensible profiles in cases of hallucination are not identical to the sensible profiles in cases of veridical seeing. Johnston holds that in veridical seeing we are presented with sensible natural kinds as well as the qualities and relations.²⁹ In hallucination, only the qualities and relations are presented to us. Given the rejection of PBP, however, this difference is not a concern. The objects of awareness are, according to Johnston, still similar enough to warrant phenomenological indistinguishability. Contrary to this, I will argue that they cannot be very similar at all. To then maintain an explanation of the

²⁶ Johnston (2004), p. 134.

²⁷ Johnston (2004), p. 135. There is a bit of an ambiguity in the account of a sensible profile. One might think of a sensible profile as a complex structural universal or as just one very complex universal. The first of these would involve many different universals arranged in some pattern which together compose the complex structural universal that one sees in the scene before one's eyes. The second would simply have the scene before one's eyes be one very big complex universal. These are subtle differences and it is not altogether clear what Johnston's final view on this is. However, Johnston is willing to countenance 'mixed cases' where there is both hallucination and veridical seeing (e.g., Macbeth hallucinating a dagger against an otherwise veridical background). It would seem that the first option will most easily handle these cases—some of the component universals of which Macbeth is aware are instantiated (the background universals) and some are not instantiated (the dagger ones). If we take the second option, it is hard to see how part of one universal could be instantiated while another part of the same universal is not. The first option, though perhaps amenable to Johnston's account, would seem to run into problems with structural universals (Lewis (1999), pp. 78–107). This is an important issue for Johnston's account, however pursuing it here would take us off course.

²⁸ Johnston (2004), p. 143.

²⁹ Since sensible profiles are the qualitative and relational properties of a scene type, it would seem that Johnston is aligning himself with a sort of property awareness. What it is to be aware of some particular is to be aware of its sensible profile, its properties. As we will see, however, this is far from clear.

phenomenological sameness as required by PUP, we will be pushed to a very odd picture of what takes place in instances of veridical seeing.

Although attention will not be focused on this aspect of the theory, it should be noted how odd it is to think that we could be aware of just the qualities and relations of a sensible profile, that is, an uninstantiated universal. If we retain some physicalist view of perception and the mind, then something very odd would be going on. We would like to say that S 's awareness of x is facilitated by x 's causal relation to S . But if S is to be aware of an uninstantiated universal, it is difficult to see how there could be any causal relation between S and the thing of which he is aware. For what possible causal relations are there between an uninstantiated universal and some physical state of an individual? To point to hallucination as an instance of such interaction between uninstantiated universals and particulars in the world is to beg the question. What other examples do we have of uninstantiated universals playing any sort of causal role? It seems to be a process cloaked in mystery. Nevertheless, I put such worries aside for the remainder of the paper.

6 A dilemma

Johnston is a non-disjunctivist. Thus, the objects of awareness in hallucination and veridical perception and the acts of awareness cannot be radically different. If they were, we would have a theory just as explanatorily bankrupt as disjunctivism. It is important to notice, however, that the object of awareness during hallucination is very different than the object of awareness in veridical seeing, and not just on account of the fact that in veridical seeing we are presented with 'sensible natural kinds'.

At first glance, however, it might seem that there is quite a lot in common between the two objects of awareness. We can formulate things in a way to make the two appear quite similar. Consider:

- H1 (hallucination): S is aware of an uninstantiated sensible profile
 S1 (veridical seeing): S is aware of a sensible profile as instantiated

However appealing this looks, it will not work. For it is certainly possible for someone to hallucinate, say, a sensible profile of a beach ball *as* instantiated. That does not thereby make it a case of veridically seeing a beach ball.

What Johnston needs is for us to be aware of instantiated sensible profiles in the case of veridical seeing (as opposed to a sensible profiles *as* instantiated) and uninstantiated profiles in the case of hallucination. He must do this while maintaining some similarity between the two objects of awareness. A rejection of PBP does not license us to hold that *any* two different objects of awareness can give rise to the same phenomenology. The argument against PBP, recall, uses the example of a room that is slowly illuminated by the morning sun. Certain consecutive phenomenological experiences of the room might be indistinguishable, even though, *ex hypothesi*, the room is continually growing lighter. But, as we've noted, the room at t_n and the room at t_{n+1} are *very* similar objects of awareness. They are both instantiated sensible profiles having extensive qualitative similarities.

In fact, Johnston does not formulate things according to S1. It is not clear, however, exactly what he has in mind for cases of veridical seeing. We might then look at several options to see how effective they are. At one point, Johnston writes: “When we see we are aware of instantiations of sensible profiles. When we hallucinate we are aware merely of the structured qualitative parts of such sensible profiles.”³⁰ This would seem to suggest the following:

- H1: *S* is aware of an uninstantiated sensible profile
 S2: *S* is aware of an instantiated sensible profile

If this is how we are to understand what is going on in hallucination and in veridical seeing then we are indeed aware of two things that are very similar. In both cases we are aware of sensible profiles, thus explaining the phenomenological sameness. There is trouble waiting, however. First, on this account we lose any epistemological advantages of direct realism since we are aware of just the same things in both veridical seeing (when there is a particular) and in hallucination (when there isn't). But more importantly, if instantiated sensible profiles are just the same as uninstantiated sensible profiles, then it isn't clear that awareness of instantiated sensible profiles really is direct awareness of a *particular*.

In response, one might think that the correct thing to say is that awareness of sensible profiles counts as being awareness of a particular just in case that sensible profile has the second-order property *being instantiated by a particular*. This will not work however. Since Johnston conceives of sensible profiles as universals, whatever second-order property that sensible profile has, it has it when it is instantiated and when it is uninstantiated. Imagine that in Seattle there is a red strawberry against a green background. Thus, the sensible profile red-strawberry-against-green-background is instantiated. Now, I am in Boston, and I hallucinate this very scene. Thus, I am aware of the red-strawberry-against-green-background sensible profile. And since this sensible profile (being a universal) has the second-order property *being instantiated by a particular*, it follows that I am veridically seeing a red strawberry against a green background. But this is false, I am hallucinating.

Further, Johnston says that in seeing, unlike in hallucination, we acquire original *de re* knowledge of particulars.³¹ If all we are aware of in cases of veridical seeing are sensible profiles, however, it would seem impossible that we acquire *de re* knowledge of particulars, if awareness of the very same sensible profiles does not lead to *de re* knowledge in cases of hallucination. Finally, many direct realists (including Johnston³²) hold that we are aware of *more* in veridical seeing than in hallucination. According to H1 and S2, it would seem that we are aware of the very same thing in both instances.

To avoid these problems, Johnston could urge that instantiated properties are somehow different than uninstantiated ones. There is, however, a complication

³⁰ Johnston (2004), p. 137.

³¹ Johnston (2004), p. 131.

³² Johnston (2004), p. 148.

waiting down this option. Remember, the denial of PBP gives us PUP that will be something like:

Awareness of an object O1 and awareness of a different object O2 can give phenomenologically indistinguishable experiences only if O1 is similar to O2.

The more we urge that the objects (of which we are aware) are different in cases of hallucination and veridical seeing, the less and less PUP is satisfied. For instance, we might construe an instantiated property as a particular, and identify the object in the world with that particularized property.³³ But then it would seem that the property we are aware of in hallucination and the property we are aware of in seeing are only nominally similar. For, properly speaking, one is a universal, and the other a particular. Surely such objects of awareness are too dissimilar to account for the phenomenological sameness. If this is Johnston's strategy, he would need to say more about how it is to work.

It seems, then, that we cannot understand Johnston as holding some sort of direct realist theory where veridical seeing is construed as *just* the act of being aware of the properties of particulars. We cannot, then, understand awareness as *property awareness*. Given Johnston's understanding of what hallucination is, if we understand veridical seeing as awareness of the properties of particulars, then we will either run into problems with Johnston's principles or be left with a theory that does not seem to make us directly aware of particulars. The theory we are given, then, is nontraditional. We must give up on understanding awareness as property awareness and instead understand veridical seeing as awareness of the particulars themselves.

At one point in the paper, Johnston gives a slightly different way of understanding veridical seeing that seems to go just this way. He says that in veridical seeing we are aware of the particular *as* instantiating a property (sensible profile). He writes: "...it is not that we see particulars *by* being visually aware of the sensible profiles that they have or instantiate. Instead, we see them *as* having certain sensible profiles, which are after all just certain complex sensible properties."³⁴ This clearly gives us a different picture than S2. Something like:

H1: *S* is aware of an uninstantiated sensible profile

S3: *S* is aware of a spatio-temporal particular *as* having a sensible profile

The immediate problem with this model is that, on the surface, it would seem that hallucination is the awareness of a universal, and veridical seeing is the awareness of a particular. These are not very similar kinds of objects, and thus not similar kinds of acts of awareness. Thus, we seem to lose the non-disjunctivism. Johnston gives an analogy to help us understand what is meant by S3. He says that S3 is expressing the same kind of thing as when we say that we see our hand *as* having five fingers. But notice that this analogy won't help. Presumably what it is to see a

³³ Johnston could, for instance, move to a trope view of properties, and thus identify the particular with a set of properties. However, this seems inconsistent with such properties being universals, and also inconsistent with his claim that there can be uninstantiated properties.

³⁴ Johnston (2004), p. 155.

hand just *is* to see its parts, five fingers (and a palm). This is why in seeing our hand we can't help but see the five fingers. But Johnston can't have this sort of thing in the awareness of particulars. If seeing a particular just is seeing the properties, then we are back to the problem with S2.³⁵

One might push in a different direction, however. Perhaps the idea is that we can be aware of some object *x*, and aware of its parts, but without the awareness of *x* just *being* the awareness of *x*'s parts. So, we might say that when I am aware of my hand I am also aware of the particles of my hand, though it is not awareness of the particles that gives awareness of the hand. Rather, things work in a more *gestalt*-type manner. On one way of understanding this, this will not help at all. For if the sensible profile is to be analogous to the particles of my hand, and we think that I have no phenomenological experience of the particles, then by analogy, I would have no phenomenological experience of the sensible profile. The sensible profile, however, is supposed to be what is doing the explanatory work for phenomenological indistinguishability.

Perhaps, though, there is some understanding of S3 amenable to non-disjunctivist direct realism. Perhaps in veridical perception we are aware of particular-cum-sensible-profile in the sort of way that doesn't either render the sensible profile the *only* object of awareness, nor totally unnecessary. That is, perhaps the sensible profile part of the object explains the phenomenology, but there is something more we are aware of thereby making it awareness of a particular. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear how such a strategy would be implemented. One can say that this is how veridical perception works, but that does not make it intelligible.

I would like to stress that there will be a difficult tension down this route. If the particular-cum-sensible-profile is exactly like an uninstantiated sensible profile, then the problem with S2 will not have been avoided. If the particular-cum-sensible-profile is too different from an uninstantiated sensible profile (as it seems to me it will be), then we have not satisfied PUP. Johnston never tells us how we are to navigate this problem. Thus, pending further comments, I do not see it is a viable option for the non-disjunctivist direct realist.

It seems, then, that we need some way of understanding veridical seeing in which we are aware of *more* than what we are aware of in hallucination. This would be in line with Johnston's comments, mentioned earlier, that this is how best to

³⁵ A further problem with the analogy is that fingers are spatio-temporal parts of the hand. But Johnston cannot have the properties be spatio-temporal parts of the particulars, otherwise the properties we are aware of in veridical seeing are vastly different than the uninstantiated non-spatio-temporal properties we are aware of in hallucination and we have violated the PUP. Johnston gives one more analogy for helping to understand S3, but the analogy is even less helpful to Johnston. He says that S3 is to be understood as analogous to the claim that, even if I'm only seeing the front of the house, I see it *as* having a back. "[This situation] is not well described by saying that the backs of the things I see are *indirect* objects of my visual awareness. They are not objects of my visual awareness at all. I see things *as* having backs, backs of which I am not yet visually aware." (154) But if the analogy is to hold, then we should conclude that in acts of seeing we are aware of the particular as having a sensible profile, but that we are not thereby aware of the sensible profile. If that is what is going on, however, then we have lost all similarity between the objects of awareness in hallucination and veridical seeing. Once again we are aware of a universal on the one hand, and a particular on the other.

understand the relation between veridical seeing and hallucination. In cases of veridical seeing we will be aware of the properties—the sensible profile—just as in hallucination, but we will also be aware of something extra, the particular. In fact, Johnston does sometimes put things this way: “In hallucination...we are instead aware of a proper part of what we are aware of in the corresponding case of seeing, a sensible profile that is no more than a certain layout of qualities.”³⁶ This would seem to give the following:

H1: *S* is aware of an uninstantiated sensible profile

S4: *S* is aware of the particular and *S* is aware of its sensible profile

On this construal, we do block the argument from hallucination (at least on its metaphysical reading, see note 16). To be aware of a particular is to be aware of its properties and aware of the particular itself. In hallucination, although we can be aware of the properties, we cannot be aware of the something extra, and so the argument doesn't go through. It is *not* the case that we are aware of the very same thing in hallucination and in veridical seeing. In fact, we are aware of *less* in the case of hallucination. Further, awareness of the same sensible profile explains the phenomenological sameness.

Nevertheless, S4 has its own difficulties. The first thing to note is that S4 sounds dangerously close to conjunctivism. Conjunctivism, at least in its paradigmatic form, is the idea that perception involves awareness of an entity, such as a sense-datum, plus some sort of representation relation between that entity and the external object. This is not *exactly* what S4 commits one to, since there is no mention of a sense-datum and the relation between the sensible profile and the particular need not be a representative one. However, there are parallels. There is still an entity of which we are aware that isn't itself the particular and that stands in some sort of relation to that particular. However, just because an analysis comes out being more conjunctivist than desired, it does not mean it is thereby identical to the forms of conjunctivism that Johnston rejects. Importantly, Johnston could hold the S4 picture of things and still not claim that the awareness of the particular was mediated in any way by the awareness of the sensible profile, thus ensuring that his view is a form of direct realism.

Another worry is that S4 seems to have saddled Johnston with an account of veridical seeing that entails two parallel acts of awareness. Johnston rejects any account of perception that entails two parallel acts. He tells us it is difficult to accept that “...in the case of seeing there are two wholly distinct acts of visual awareness, the one awareness of external objects and the other awareness of what one could be aware of even if one were hallucinating.”³⁷ We might try to save this construal from such a conception by understanding S4 in a way such that one of the acts of awareness is somehow different than the other one. So, for instance, perhaps one of the acts of awareness is doxastic awareness and the other is property awareness.

³⁶ Johnston (2004), pp. 137–138.

³⁷ Johnston (2004), p. 117.

S4 is surely not ideal. Despite this, it seems that it is the best option for Johnston so far considered.³⁸ It allows an escape from the problem of hallucination and it provides an act/object account of veridical seeing and hallucination. A disadvantage is that S4 sounds a lot like conjunctivism. But I have argued that one can maintain a direct realist picture of things despite such appearances.³⁹ A more serious disadvantage of S4 is that it seems to entail two parallel acts of awareness during acts of perception. I have hinted that there might be ways to make this look more palatable by understanding ‘awareness’ in different ways. The viability of such a strategy will be the focus of the rest of this paper. Before we can really evaluate the plausibility of S4, however, we will need to get a bit more precise about these different acts of awareness, especially in light of Johnston’s Differentiating Principle.

7 Acts of awareness

Recall the picture we have adopted:

Hallucination: S is aware of an uninstantiated sensible profile

Seeing: S is aware of the particular and S is aware of its sensible profile

Since a particular is different than a sensible profile, and because of DP, Johnston is committed to the idea that there are two distinct *kinds* of acts of awareness. There is the awareness of sensible profiles and the awareness of particulars. For clarity, we can call the awareness of sensible profiles ‘awareness_{*h*}’ and the awareness of particulars, we can call ‘awareness*’.

Johnston wants the awareness in the case of seeing to be such that it contains awareness_{*h*} as a proper part. Thus, awareness* is *not* the awareness that takes place in cases of seeing. The awareness in cases of veridical seeing is actually composed of two proper parts. One part is the common core between hallucination and seeing, and thus awareness_{*h*}. The other part is awareness of the particular, awareness*. This gives us the following picture:

Hallucination: awareness_{*h*}

Veridical Seeing: awareness_{*s*} = awareness_{*h*} + awareness*

At some points, this very picture sounds like what Johnston has in mind: “In hallucination...we are instead aware of a *proper part* of what we are aware of in the corresponding case of seeing, a sensible profile that is no more than a certain layout of qualities.”⁴⁰ Since acts of awareness are differentiated by *kinds* objects they take

³⁸ I do not mean to indicate that this is the theory that Johnston has in mind. Rather, until further clarification of the S-principle, this is a theory that is in line with Johnston’s principles, achieves Johnston’s aims, and (most importantly) is understandable.

³⁹ In fact, David Hilbert notes that Johnston is perhaps closer to conjunctivism than he admits, thus supporting the S4 reading: “It would be better, perhaps for Johnston to embrace his conjunctivist heritage, for the issues that separate him from his fellow conjunctivists have nothing specifically to do with the proper response to the argument from hallucination.” (Hilbert 2004, pp. 186–187).

⁴⁰ Johnston (2004), p. 138. Emphasis mine.

(DP), and the object taken by the act of awareness in hallucination is a proper part of the object of awareness in veridical seeing, this picture seems correct. On the other hand, Johnston wants us to be aware of instantiations of sensible profiles. Though this account does so, it does so in a piecemeal fashion: we are aware of the instantiating particular *and* we are aware of the sensible profile.

One could deny that this conception of things has it quite right, arguing that it is a misunderstanding to see awareness_v (the veridical kind) composed of parts in this sort of way. Awareness_v is simply the entire act of being aware of sensible-profile-cum-particular, with the two components of awareness somehow ‘fused’ together. Echoing worries from the previous section over S3, it simply is not clear how we could sensibly fill in such a metaphor. In addition, notice that if we don’t construe awareness_v as actually having proper parts, then the phenomenological sameness we are trying to explain falls into mystery. We would then have a case where in veridical seeing there is one kind of awareness with one kind of object, and in hallucination there is a different kind of awareness with a different kind of object, and nevertheless the phenomenology is indistinguishable. We cannot just point to the *phrase* ‘sensible profile’ and call *this* the commonality if there is no carry-over to the actual objects of which we are aware. It seems, then, that we must take Johnston in the way outlined above.

Since we have these different kinds of awareness, we might ask which we are taking as primitive. Which one is awareness in the paradigmatic sense? Johnston is clear that hallucination is to involve a deficient form of awareness that proceeds derivatively from that of veridical seeing: “Hallucination is a degenerate state, a failure of the visual system to function properly...having external objects and their visible features disclosed to us is the default ability that comes with having a functioning visual system.”⁴¹

Paradigmatic awareness, then, is awareness_v of particulars. Accordingly, awareness_h must lack something that is true of paradigmatic awareness. And we see that it does: it lacks awareness*. This thing it lacks, however, must be phenomenologically inert. In other words, the fact that awareness_h lacks awareness* cannot be phenomenologically noticeable. If it were, then we could phenomenologically distinguish hallucination from veridical experience. Since we cannot, awareness* is phenomenologically inert. We are now confronted with a troubling question: What exactly *is* awareness*?⁴²

In fact, we see now that it is awareness_h that packs the phenomenological punch. Thus, awareness_h turns out to be the kind of awareness that is commonly discussed with reference to perception, the kind of awareness that is aligned with phenomenological experience. It is not the object of *hallucination* that ends up being so obscure. In fact, for Johnston, the object we are aware of in hallucination is the thing that we have been phenomenologically experiencing the entire time.

⁴¹ Johnston (2004), p. 151.

⁴² In this way, awareness* seems to be very similar to what Dretske calls *object-awareness*. “Object-awareness has to do not with the qualities of one’s experience, but with the causal relations of the experience to objects in the world.” (Dretske (2000) p. 164–165) We might ask the same question of Dretske: In what sense is object-awareness a species of *awareness* at all in that it gives no phenomenological experience?

Rather it is our act of awareness of real world objects—the things we are aware* of—that ends up being so obscure, at least from a phenomenological perspective.

Note, then, the strange picture with which we are presented. In veridical perception there are two simultaneous and unrelated acts of awareness. One is the awareness of sensible profiles that furnishes us with phenomenological experience. The other is awareness of the particulars themselves, but which is phenomenologically inert.

One could say that the picture of perception is being misrepresented. In fact, it is the total act, awareness_s, that captures what *real* awareness is. In this way, there are not really two simultaneous and unrelated acts of awareness. But if this is the picture, then it is more than a little misleading to say that we are properly *aware* of anything in the case of hallucination. In hallucination there is no act of awareness_s taking place, and so there would be no act of awareness, properly speaking. In hallucination there is only awareness_h, and for this response to work, awareness_h can't count as proper awareness on its own.⁴³

A sensible response is to maintain that both awareness_h and awareness* are complete acts of awareness, but that these two acts of awareness are not totally unrelated. That is, awareness_h is somehow lawfully/reliably correlated with awareness* such that the sensible profiles we are aware_h of (and which have phenomenological import) are similar to, or caused by, the particulars that we are aware* of. There are two ways that one might implement this idea. One could hold that awareness* is mediated by awareness_h or that awareness_h is mediated by awareness*.

The first option is clearly unacceptable. If awareness* is mediated by awareness_h then our awareness of particulars is not direct. The second option is more interesting. The idea is that in veridical perception we are directly aware of particulars, and mediately aware of the properties of those particulars. In the corresponding state of hallucination, we are directly aware of the sensible profile, the uninstantiated properties. It is the awareness_h of the sensible profile in both instances that explains the phenomenological indistinguishability, although in one instance this awareness is mediated and in the other this awareness is direct.

However interesting, I think that this response fails, too. To see why we need to say more about what it is to have indirect or mediated awareness of something. Consider the scenario where I am aware of the president giving a speech by being aware of a television screen where he is pictured. We can plausibly say that my awareness of the president giving a speech is mediated by my awareness of the images on the television screen. Take this as a paradigm case of mediated awareness. A nice way of cashing this out is in terms of counterfactual dependence: At that time, had I not been aware of the television screen, I would not have been aware of the president giving his speech.

Now, on the proposal being considered, the direct realist claims that we are directly aware of a particular and then mediately aware of its sensible profile. If we cash this out in terms of counterfactual dependence we get the following:

⁴³ Perhaps this lends support to Huemer's (2001) claim that we should understand hallucination such that it is not even a species of awareness at all. This, however, is not Johnston's view.

Had I not been aware of that particular, I would not have been aware of that sensible profile.

The problem with this is that standard cases of hallucination are straightforward counterexamples to such a counterfactual. It is not in general true that had Francis Scott Key not been aware of the rockets then he wouldn't have been aware of the red glare, because he could have hallucinated the red glare. If the direct realist wants to claim that we are mediately aware of the sensible profile by being directly aware of the particular, then we need some way of understanding such mediation that is not cashed out in terms of counterfactual dependence.

Another option is to understand mediation in terms of inference. We are aware that the flag has a certain sensible profile only after we are aware of the flag itself. Unfortunately, this will not work. For the inference gives us awareness *that* something is the case, awareness *that* some particular has some sensible profile. But the awareness of the sensible profile in hallucination is *not* awareness *that* but rather awareness *simpliciter*. Even if it is a fact about our psychological makeup that we are aware that some particular has a certain sensible profile only after we are aware of the particular itself, this will not explain the similarity between hallucination and veridical perception. For in hallucination we are aware of uninstantiated sensible profiles, and in veridical perception (on this response) we are aware of particulars and aware that they have certain sensible profiles. Awareness *that* is not the same as awareness *simpliciter*.

As a final attempt, we might cash out mediated awareness in terms of causal mediation.⁴⁴ That is, our awareness of the sensible profile is mediated if that awareness is caused by the awareness of the particular. This seems to be the most appealing way to go, but I think it raises more questions than it answers. First, we might wonder what it is for an act of awareness to *cause* another act awareness. This is certainly an odd way to talk. There are certainly causal intermediaries between the particular in the world, and my nervous system responding appropriately. To make this response work, one would need some way of marking off acts of awareness so that they are the right sort of things to be the relata of causal relations. Further, one would have to do this in such a way so that the awareness of the particular is not causally mediated by anything else and so that the awareness of the properties is causally mediated by the awareness of the particulars. Finally, all this needs to be done in such a way that the mediated awareness of the properties is the same kind of awareness of properties that we have in hallucination. This seems a tall order to fill. The conclusion of all this is that the act of awareness in veridical perception (awareness_v), though it contains awareness* and awareness_h as parts, cannot be such that either of them mediate the other.

It seems, then, that we must stick with the odd picture. Hallucination is direct awareness_h of sensible profiles. Veridical seeing is direct awareness_h of sensible profiles and direct awareness* of particulars. According to this account, Johnston (so-construed) still gives us a direct realist picture. We still have direct realism since the awareness of particulars is unmediated. Importantly, however, awareness* will

⁴⁴ This strategy will not be significantly different from the first if we understand causation in terms of counterfactual dependence.

be divorced from phenomenology, since this is taken care of by awareness_{*h*}.⁴⁵ This leads to some unattractive consequences.

First, one of the main epistemological advantages of direct realism seems to be lost. We no longer have any reason to think that we experience the world as it really is, for our phenomenological experience is wholly explained by awareness_{*h*}, and the object of such an awareness is a sensible profile, and sensible profiles are *not* particulars. Along these same lines, we seem to have lost the ability to see phenomenological experience of particulars as a good foundation for knowledge of the external world. If we were directly aware of particulars through phenomenological experience, we might think that this phenomenological experience could either serve as the foundational base for knowledge or at least lead to foundational beliefs. Once we remove the phenomenological experience of particulars, however, it is unclear how awareness* can serve as a foundation for knowledge, that is, if the foundation is supposed to come from phenomenological experience.

Importantly, we also seem to have lost the metaphysical advantages of direct realism on this picture. It was thought that direct realism provided a more parsimonious picture of things, eliminating internal sense-data and rendering awareness a simple two-place relation between a particular in the world and an agent. With awareness*, however, direct realism is not so simple. We are left with different kinds of awareness, each which take a different object. Awareness_{*h*} takes a sensible profile as its object, and awareness* takes a particular as its object. Awareness_{*s*} is then a combination of the two. The ontological parsimony seems lost.

The puzzle, then, is as follows. If Johnston is going to be a direct realist then he must hold that we have direct awareness of particulars. If, in addition, he is going to be a non-disjunctivist then there needs to be some explanation of the phenomenological indistinguishability between veridical perception and hallucination. We have seen that this involves the claim that awareness_{*s*} involves two parts: awareness_{*h*} and awareness*. Neither can be mediated by the other and there can be no lawful/reliable correlation between the two. We understand awareness_{*h*}; it is the awareness of properties that we have in both hallucination and in veridical perception. It is unclear, however, what awareness* is. It is critical to direct realism that we have such an awareness in veridical perception. This is where the *directness* of direct realism is to come from. And yet such an awareness is phenomenologically inert. The puzzle is to furnish a non-phenomenological role for awareness* while still maintaining its status as a species of awareness, and perhaps regain some of the advantages of a direct realist view. The remainder of the paper will consider several non-phenomenological options for awareness*.

⁴⁵ Recall Dretske's distinction between *property*-awareness and *object*-awareness. I take it that these correspond, respectively, to awareness_{*h*} and awareness*. Thus, the difficulties that follow are similarly difficulties for Dretske's (2000) account.

8 Doxastic awareness

Awareness* must be phenomenologically inert, but surely it must have *some* role. If it were wholly inert, then it seems there would be no good reason for positing such an awareness, except to facilitate a direct realist answer to the problem of hallucination.

It seems to me that there are two plausible non-phenomenological roles for awareness*, and these correspond to the kind of direct realism that identifies awareness with belief acquisition. On the one hand, awareness* might have a doxastic role, and on the other hand, it might have an epistemic role. As mentioned, though believing and knowing sometimes go hand in hand with phenomenology, this is certainly not always the case, and so perhaps there is real work that awareness* can do. Further, it seems that there aren't really any other options for the role of awareness* such that it still would deserve the title 'awareness'. Awareness is typically thought of as a two-place relation between a subject and an object. If awareness* were to give the subject no phenomenological experience of the object, no beliefs about the object, and no knowledge of the object, it is difficult to see what sort of relation we could be talking about, and why such a relation would deserve the title 'awareness' at all. We will thus first investigate what it would be for awareness* to have a doxastic component, and then what it might be for awareness* to have an epistemic component. If nothing can be made of these two conceptions, this formulation of Johnston's theory will be in trouble. The theory would lack any of the advantages of direct realism. In addition, awareness* will be unmotivated and obscure.

We start, then, by considering awareness* as having a kind of doxastic edge to it. According to this construal, when we see particulars (rather than hallucinate them) awareness* of the particular gives us the *belief* that there is an object before us instantiating the profile in a way that we do not get such a belief when we are hallucinating. Obviously this belief will not be the sort of introspectively available belief. I cannot, as it were, be aware of this belief or conscious of it, otherwise we will have violated the Hallucination Hypothesis. This is not much of a problem, however. There are plenty of examples of beliefs that subjects have and yet of which they are totally unconscious. Take, for example, a classic Freudian case where a subject has a belief that guides action and yet this belief is not available to the subject in any way. Our Freudian subject might have the unconscious (or subconscious) belief that if he gets emotionally close to someone, that person will end up hurting him. We might attribute this belief to the fact that his mother and father abandoned him when he was a young child. Further, we think that he has such a belief because it guides his actions in certain cases, even when he is not aware of this fact.

This last point is extremely important. The reason that we think it is right to ascribe a belief to our subject is because there is behavior which is in line with having certain beliefs. Thus, even though the subject does not avow a certain belief, we infer it from his action and behavior. It would, however, be a very odd thing to attribute a belief to our subject which he both did not avow and which had no effect on his behavior. Indeed, we might wonder what claim there could be for such a

thing being a belief at all. If the subject does not have any access to the belief and the belief has no effect on behavior or action, it seems that we are not really talking about belief anymore.

Now, is it possible that awareness* gives us the belief that there is a particular before us, even though that belief is not available to us? Perhaps this seems plausible. After all there are manifest behaviors that seem to show that in cases of veridical seeing people have beliefs that there are particulars before them, and not just sensible profiles. When people are seeing particulars, they do things like reach for them, talk about them, point to them and such. We can even imagine certain unreflective subjects who aren't ever aware of such beliefs in cases of veridical seeing, though those beliefs are in fact there. We seem to have good evidence, then, that subjects who are veridically seeing have beliefs that particulars are before them. So perhaps awareness* is this kind of doxastic awareness.

This account runs into trouble, however. First of all, the kind of beliefs we have when we are seeing particulars are normally *not* the kind of beliefs we are unable to access. We generally both have the belief that there is a particular before us, and are able to reflect at will upon this fact. The larger problem, however, is that we seem to have these same beliefs in cases of hallucination. When Macbeth hallucinates the dagger before him, he has just the same sort of behavioral responses as someone who actually sees a dagger. Indeed, Macbeth asks questions about the dagger, talks about it, reaches for it, and demonstrates it. These are all the sorts of behaviors that we were taking as evidence that certain beliefs about particulars were present in the case of veridical seeing. But if all the same conscious beliefs are there, and all the same behaviors are there, then it seems that any belief that is present in veridical seeing is going to be accountable in terms of the common core, awareness_n, and not some extra doxastic awareness*. Macbeth has the same beliefs (whether conscious or not) when he hallucinates the dagger as he would when he really sees it.⁴⁶

It seems, then, that the extra bit of awareness that is added in the case of veridical seeing cannot be doxastic awareness. We need some sort of behavioral evidence for an unconscious belief, otherwise we have no business even calling it a belief at all. However, any behavioral evidence we have for an unconscious belief in the case of veridical perception is mirrored in cases of hallucination. So, it seems to the extent that acts of awareness cause beliefs (whether conscious or otherwise), it is the common core, awareness_n, that is doing the work.

There is a possible exception to all of this. If we grant that belief states have so-called 'wide content', then the beliefs in the case of hallucinating a dagger and the beliefs in the case of seeing a dagger will have different contents. In the case of seeing, the content will include the real dagger, and in the case of hallucinating, the content will presumably not include the real dagger. One might think, then, there is a sliver of hope for awareness* if one pursues doxastic awareness in this way. There would then be different beliefs present in cases of veridical seeing than are present

⁴⁶ Up to the point, of course, where he reaches for the dagger and does not grasp it. But here is where the Hallucination Hypothesis breaks down. At this point there is no longer the phenomenological indistinguishability between hallucination and veridical seeing. Macbeth is here making use of other sensory modalities, those very ones which give different information in the case of hallucination versus veridical perception.

in cases of hallucination, because the beliefs about the particular in cases of veridical seeing have the real-world particular as part of their content, whereas the beliefs in cases of hallucination do not have the real-world particular as part of their content. Perhaps the role of awareness* is to give us a belief with this differing content.

There is something odd about this picture, however. One way we might go is to construe awareness_h as giving us one belief (about a sensible profile) while awareness* gives us a different belief with the wide content (about the particular). Since awareness_s is composed of each of those, both would take place in cases of veridical perception. This is odd. For when beliefs are said to have wide content, it is not normally meant that there is one belief (from awareness_h) that guides behavior and gives rise to phenomenology, and a wholly different belief having the real-world particular as its content. Since all of an agent's behavior and avowal of belief can be explained in terms of the belief acquired from awareness_h, on this picture it is still unclear what the *need* for awareness* is.

To keep from viewing awareness* and awareness_h as giving rise to two wholly distinct beliefs, we might think of things in the following way. Perhaps awareness_h gives a certain content to the belief, and then, in cases of veridical perception, awareness* gives extra content to that same belief, content that includes the particular in the world. The difference between veridical perception and hallucination is that awareness* reaches a bit further than just awareness_h, all the way to the particular itself, adding further content to the belief.⁴⁷ This is an odd scenario, however, because we will have part of the belief content (indeed the content which we are able to reflect on) that comes from awareness_h that just so happens to correspond with the additional content coming from awareness*. We might think there are opportunities for these two awarenesses to yield contents that come apart.

Imagine a scenario in which my properly functioning eyes are directed at a desk lamp that is switched off. However, I am hallucinating a desk lamp that is switched on. In this case, because I am aware_h of a switched-on-lamp sensible profile, I will have the belief that there is a switched-on lamp before me. But because I am aware* of a switched-off lamp particular, added to this same belief will be the switched-off lamp content. The result will be a very odd belief, indeed. It will be one belief with content 'switched-on lamp profile and switched-off lamp particular'. The commonsense thing to say in such a scenario is that I am *not* aware of the particular at all when I am experiencing a hallucination, even if my eyes *are* directed at some particular. The claim would have to be that if I am hallucinating, then awareness* just doesn't have a chance to do any work. But notice that there is no principled reason for holding this. According to Johnston's account, hallucinations are instances of awareness_h of sensible profiles. But exactly similar instances of awareness_h of sensible profiles are occurring in cases of veridical perception as well. It is artificial to hold that awareness* stops adding content to a belief only if that content doesn't match up with the content given by awareness_h. This does not seem to be a plausible strategy.

⁴⁷ Perhaps this is what Johnston means when he writes: "Seeing goes all the way out to the things seen, the things with which it acquaints the subject." (p. 139)

Awareness_{*}, then, is not only phenomenologically inert, but cannot plausibly play a doxastic role. We next see if awareness_{*} can play some sort of *epistemic* role.

9 Epistemic awareness

As a first stab at this we could say that when we are in cases of veridical seeing, we are aware_{*} of the particular itself and thus *know* that there is a particular before us in a way that we do not in cases of hallucination. There is an immediate problem with this, however, that comes from considering the lamp scenario just introduced. Assume that awareness_{*} gives knowledge *that* such-and-such particular is before one's eyes. Thus, because I am aware_{*} of the switched-off lamp, I will know that there is a switched-off lamp particular before me. Because knowledge involves belief, I will also believe that there is a switched-off lamp before me. But because of my hallucination, I will believe that there is a switched-on lamp before me, and because I believe that switched-on and switched-off are mutually exclusive states, I also believe that it is *not* the case that there is a switched-off lamp before me. Again, we are left with a psychologically strange state of affairs. This shouldn't be too surprising, however. If awareness_{*} is not able to play a doxastic role, it is unlikely that it can play the more demanding epistemic role.

We might, though, take a step back and furnish awareness_{*} with a role in the acquisition of knowledge, though not as being sufficient for knowledge by itself. We might claim that awareness_{*} gives us direct acquaintance of particulars in a way that is necessary for knowledge. On this account awareness_{*} functions to give us some *de re* acquaintance of the particulars themselves. We could then say that when one forms the belief *that* particular *a* is *F*, while simultaneously having direct acquaintance *of a*, then one can have knowledge *that a* is *F*. So-construed, awareness_{*} of particulars is sort of a standing condition that must be in place so that we are able to have knowledge about those particulars. In cases of hallucination, then, we can never have knowledge of particulars, because we do not have awareness_{*} of such particulars.

This seems to me to be one way that Johnston could carry his analysis. It is an odd way of viewing things, however. According to the definition of direct realism offered at the beginning of this paper, such a theory would be direct realist in letter. However, I doubt if it is direct realist in spirit. There is awareness_{*} of particulars that is unmediated by any prior act of awareness. However, all of our beliefs and all of our phenomenological experience will be explained in terms of awareness_h of sensible profiles. Awareness_{*} has been reduced to a standing necessary condition for knowledge. Since awareness_{*} does not furnish us with beliefs, awareness_{*} is not sufficient for providing knowledge on its own. It is then hard to see how requiring awareness_{*} in cases of veridical perception is any different than requiring that to have perceptual knowledge of a particular, such a particular must exist and actually be present. Once that condition is in place, awareness_h seems to take over.

We could try to furnish awareness_{*} with a bit more of a role by saying that it confers some justification to certain perceptual beliefs. Thus, if I am aware_{*} of the particular before me, I am not only meeting one of the necessary conditions for

knowledge, I am also therefore justified in believing that there is a particular before me if I were to entertain such a belief. This, however, would seem redundant, because in cases of hallucination we are arguably justified in the beliefs we acquire from that hallucination. In the case of veridical seeing, then, awareness_h would be doing all the justificatory work needed.

We might try to alter this, however, in line with James Pryor's (2000) account of immediate justification. The story would go that we are immediately justified to believe that particular *a* is before us if we are aware* of particular *a*. This justification can be defeated. In the lamp example just given, our subject would have immediate justification for the proposition that the lamp is off, and yet that would be defeated by the hallucinatory awareness_h that a lamp is on. In the case of veridical seeing, however, our immediate justification will get boosted by the phenomenological evidence that corroborates it and thus we can come to know that the lamp is on. It seems that Johnston indeed has something like this in mind when he writes:

I think that this points to a new and promising combination of Reliabilism and Foundationalism, one on which what is sensed neither justifies nor merely causes immediate perceptual belief, but instead confers the kind of authority on immediate perceptual belief which allows it in its turn to justify the inferential beliefs based on it.⁴⁸

Perhaps such an account is initially plausible. But it seems that if the phenomenological evidence in the case of hallucination is a defeater of the immediate justification of awareness*, then that same phenomenological evidence should give us immediate justification itself. It is, then, still unclear what the *need* is for something like awareness*.⁴⁹

The best we can do, it seems, is to view awareness* as giving us acquaintance of the particular in a non-phenomenological and non-doxastic sort of way. Its only connection to knowledge is as a sort of necessary standing condition that must be in place such that knowledge is possible. But it is hard to see that we will have avoided the main thrust of the argument from hallucination, then. For we are aware_h of the same thing in both hallucination and veridical seeing. It's just that in the case of veridical seeing there also happens to be a particular before us, which we are aware* of. This awareness, however, is non-phenomenological, non-doxastic, and non-epistemic. This certainly isn't the kind of awareness that direct realists have in mind when they claim that we have direct awareness of particulars. In fact, it does not seem to be much like awareness at all, thus threatening the goal of the direct realist project.

Johnston, of course, could respond by giving a more perspicuous picture of just what happens in cases of veridical seeing. Perhaps the understanding according to S4 distorts what he had in mind. I have tried to argue that S4 is the best we can do such that we are consistent with his principles, retain a direct realist theory, and

⁴⁸ Johnston (2004), p. 149.

⁴⁹ In addition, an account such as this would depart from Pryor's conception of immediate justification where phenomenological experiential states are paradigmatic cases of states that give immediate justification.

escape the argument from hallucination. I have further argued that S4 does not give us a theory that is very attractive. Perhaps, however, there is a promising alternative way of conceiving of veridical seeing that avoids the problems presented here.

I would like to urge that a clarification of the theory in a way that is helpful to Johnston's account strikes me as unlikely. The problem seems to lie in the project of carving out a direct realist theory that falls somewhere between disjunctivism and conjunctivism and can escape the problem of hallucination. There just doesn't seem to be enough space to carve out a theory that can meet such goals, not even a theory as complex and thought-provoking as Johnston's.

References

- Armstrong, D. M. (1976). *A materialist theory of mind*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Armstrong, D. M. (1961). *Perception and the physical world*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- BonJour, L. (2004). In search of direct realism. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 69, 349–367.
- Brown, H. (1992). Direct realism, indirect realism, and epistemology. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 52, 341–363.
- Dretske, F. (2000). *Perception, knowledge and belief*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Dretske, F. (1982). *Knowledge and the flow of information*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Fish, W. (2004). The direct/indirect distinction in contemporary philosophy of perception. *Essays in Philosophy*, 5, 1–13.
- Hilbert, D. (2004). Hallucination, sense-data and direct realism. *Philosophical Studies*, 120, 185–191.
- Huemer, M. (2001). *Skepticism and the veil of perception*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Jackson, F. (1977). *Perception*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Johnston, M. (2004). The obscure object of hallucination. *Philosophical Studies*, 120, 113–183.
- Kelley, D. (1986). *The evidence of the senses*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press.
- Lewis, D. (1999). *Papers in metaphysics and epistemology*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- LeMorvan, P. (2004). Arguments against direct realism and how to counter them. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 41, 221–234.
- Pitcher, G. (1971). *A theory of perception*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Price, H. H. (1961). *Perception*. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.
- Pryor, J. (2000). The skeptic and the dogmatist. *Nous*, 34, 517–549.
- Russell, B. (1997). *The problems of philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ward, A. (1976). Direct and indirect realism. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 13, 287–294.